

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 CCO-00

/150 W

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R 010845Z DEC 73

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 665

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSQ TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 641

EMO. 11652: GDS

TAVS: XF, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAQI POSITION ON SETTLEMENT

REF: BAGHDAD 619 AND 624

1. SUMMARY: LEBANESE PRIME MINISTEC'S VISIT HAS PROVIDED FURTHER INSIGHT INTO GOI POSITION TOWARD SETTLEMENT. WHILE PUBLIC POSITION INCREASINGLY UNCOMPROMISING, GOVERNMENT HAS WELL REASONED CASE FOR REJECTING SETTLEMENT BASED MN VIEW THAT SETTLEMENT WOULD THREATEN IOS OWN SURVIVAL. END SUMMARY.

2. DUCING COURSE OF NOV 21-23 VISIT TO BAGHDADILEBANESE PRIMEIMINISTER TAKIEDDIN SOLH HAD LONG EXCHANGES ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WITH PRESUDENT AL-BAKR AND RCC VICE CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN. VISIT TOOK PLACE BECAUSE OF LEBANESE BELIEF, ENERGETICALLY PUSHED BY AMBASSADOR SHAMMAS, THAT IT BETTER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH IRAQIS THAN TO IGNORE THEM  
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AS SADAT CONTINUES TO DO. ALTHOUGH LEBANESE VIEWS DIFFERED

SHARPLY FROM IRAQ'S, IRAQ RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO LEBANESE EXPLANATIONS.

3. IRAQI POSITION WAS OUTLINED WITH CLARITY AND REALISM BY SADDAM ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: IRAQI POSITION NOT INFLUENCED BY PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS (ALTHOUGH IN FACT THROUGHOUT CONVERUATIONS IT WAS CLEAR IRAQIS INCENSED BY EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FAILURE TO CONSULT THEM) BUT BY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF SITUATION. ALTHOUGH NOT CONSULTED ABOUT WAR AND AWARE THAT UAFAT'S AIMS WERE LIMITED, IRAQ HAD ENTERED WAR WITH FULL FORCE BECAUSE IT FELT WAR WOULD LEAD TO ALL OUTIWAR OF ATTRITIOC. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED AND IRAQ HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SUCPRISE BY EGYPTIAN AND PARTICULARLY SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASE-FIRE. IRAQ AGAIN OVERLOOKED THESE SLIGHTS, AND AFTER OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS

DECIDED IT COULD NOT ACCEPT EITHER CEASE-FIRE OR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SETTLEMENT FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: (AL FOR 25 YEARS IRAQ HAS OPPOSED AS MATTEC OF PRINCIPLE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND REGIME COULD NOT CHANGE THAT POLICY. NEVERTHELESS, IRAQ RECOGNIZED THAT INTERNATIONAL REALITIES WERE SUCH THAT ARABS COULD NOT HOPE TO ELIMINATE ISRAELM IT EVEN RECOGNIZED DESIRABILITY OF ACHIEVING ISRAELI RETURN TO PRE-1967 BORDERS. IT COULD NOT, HOWEVEC, ENDORSE 1967 BORDERS AU PERMANENT SINCE IT WOULD REQUIRE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND SURRENDER OF RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS. (B) ISRAEL WILL BE INTRANSIGENT IN NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BRING HER ALONG. (GOI BITTER WITH EGYPTIANS FOR LIMITED WAR STRATEGY AND IMPLIED THAT EGYPT HAD HT GONE ALL OUT TO CRUSH ISRAELI DRIVE ON WEST BANK THEREBY UNDERCUTTING ARAB BARGAINING POSITION.) IRAQ WOULD, BY REMAINING TRUE TO IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE, BE ABLE TO HOLD TOGETHER FORCES REQUIRED TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE AFTER SETTLEMENT EFFORTS FAILED. KC) IRAQ ABSTAINED FROM PARTICIPATION IN ARAB SUMMIT IN ORDER TO AVOID OPEN CLEAVAGE AMONG ACABS. IRAQ WOULD NOT ACTIVELY LOBBY WITH OTHER STATES AGAINST SETTLEMENT. IT DID NOT GIVE ANY SUCH GUACANTEE AS REGARDS FEDAYEEN.

2.: RATHER THAN MAKE FRONTAL ATTACKIOC GOI POSITION, PM UOLH HAD SAIF CONFINING OF ISRAEL TO PRE-1967 BMRFERS  
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WOULD BE BEGINNING OF END OFIZIONISM SINCE IT INHERENTLY EXPANSIONIST. SOLH HAD ALSO SAID GOL HAD DISCUSSED PEACE CONFERECCCE WITH U.S. AND EGYPT AND PLACNED TO PARTICIPATE. IRAQIS RECOGNIZED GOL POSITION WITHOUT ENDORSING IT AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR EXPLANATION.

5. BAATH PARTY TAKING INCREASINGLY EXTREME POSITIONS IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH PFLP (GC) ISSUED NOV 30 TWO PARTIES

APPEALED TO OTHERS TO SUPPORT "ACAB REJECTION FRONTS AND  
CARRY ON STRUGGLE UNTIL FULL LIBERATION OF PALESTINIAN  
TERCITORY.

6. COMMENT: EXTREMISM OF PUBLIC POSITION IS BELIEVED TO  
EMANATE FROM CONTINUED NEGLECT OF IRAQ BY SADAT, INCREASINGLY  
IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY SAUDI ARABIA, ACD POPULARITY OF  
POSITION AMONG PARTY RANK AND FILE. BEHIND RHETORIC, HOWEVER,  
IRAQI REGIME FEELS THREATENED BY SADAT-FEISAL ALLIANCE AND  
GROWING POWER OF "REACTIONARY" ARAB LEADERS AT EXPENSE OF  
"RADICALS". REGIME BELIEVES THAT SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD REMOVE  
RADICALS MOST POWERFUL PROPAGANDA RALLYING CRY OF PAST  
20 YEARS, WOULD UNDERCUT "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS SUCH AS  
BAATH AND LESSEN ROLE OF THEIR PRINCIPAL PROTECTOR, THE  
SOVIET UNION, THEREBY POSING DIRECT THREAT TO EXISTENCE  
OF IRAQI REGIME.

7. ALTHOUGH THEIR RELUCTANCE UNDERSTANDABLE, EGYPT AND OTHER  
MODERATE ARAB REGIMES WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE AND  
POSSIBLY SOMETHING TO GAIN IF THEY FOLLOWED LEBANESE EXAMPLE  
AND TRIED TO BRING IRAQ ALONG PATH OF SETTLEMENT.

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO. LOWRIE

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